Optimal rules for patent races by Judd, Kenneth L et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2012
Optimal rules for patent races
Judd, Kenneth L; Schmedders, Karl; Yeltekin, Sevin
Abstract: There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive
the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules.
A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race, chooses the
patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that efficiency cost of prizes
is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms are similar, and
social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur
innovation and filter out inferior innovators.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00670.x
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-60863
Originally published at:
Judd, Kenneth L; Schmedders, Karl; Yeltekin, Sevin (2012). Optimal rules for patent races. International
Economic Review, 53(1):23-52. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00670.x
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797891
OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES ∗
By Kenneth L. Judd, Karl Schmedders, and S¸evin Yeltekin †
Hoover Institution, U.S.A.; University of Zurich, Switzerland.; Carnegie Mellon University, U.S.A.
November 18, 2010
Abstract
There are two important patent race rules: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the
patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these
rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation
race, chooses the patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that
efficiency cost of prizes is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs
are low, firms are similar, and social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy
involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur innovation and filter out inferior innovators.
JEL: C61, C63, C73, L43, L50
Keywords: Patent Race, Patent Policy, Stochastic Dynamic Games, Markov-perfect Equilibria.
1 Introduction
Patent systems use races to spur innovation. Firms compete to be the first to develop a new product
and obtain a patent and monopoly rights to sell that product. It’s been long argued (see Wright
(1983) for an earlier criticism) that patent systems may be suboptimal mechanisms because they
spark races and generate wasteful duplication of effort. As Loury (1979) noted, races also have
offsetting benefits: increased investment leads to quicker innovation. Therefore a patent system
designed to encourage innovation must carefully weigh the benefits of quick innovation against the
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2 OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES
over-investment cost generated by races. In this paper, we provide a model of optimal patent rules
that endogenizes the choice of races in designing incentives for innovation. Our environment has
two important features. First, we assume that innovation is a multistage process and find that
the waste induced by patent races can be moderated by filing requirements, that is, by deciding
the stage of an innovation process at which the patent is granted. Second, we explicitly model
the product market inefficiencies of a patent monopoly and argue that these inefficiencies must be
considered along with any waste generated by a patent race when evaluating patent policies. In
general, there are two ways to stimulate innovation: offer a big prize to a single innovator, or offer
a smaller prize but use a race to threaten each firm that the prize will go to his competitor. When
both incentive devices have inefficiencies, it is generally best to use both.
We model races as multistage stochastic games between heterogenous firms. Firms differ in their
cost of innovation. They proceed through several stages of progress (e.g. rough idea, blue print,
prototype), with the final stage culminating in successful innovation and a marketable product. For
a given patent policy, our dynamic, stochastic innovation race resembles those studied by Fudenberg
et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985a,b, 1987). However, we endogenize patent policy by
embedding this game into the problem of a patent authority that selects the rules governing the
races.
We study the optimal policy of a patent authority who can verify partial success at the time of
a patent application, but cannot observe an individual firm’s efficiency. The patent authority has
access to policy tools typically used in patent systems. First, it chooses when to award the patent,
namely, it chooses the innovation stage at which a patent or an exclusive contract is awarded to a
firm and the race is terminated. This represents the minimal accomplishment necessary and the
filing requirements to obtain a patent and sets the length of a patent race. Firms race as long as
no firm has achieved this level, but as soon as one has met the requirements of the patent rules, it
proceeds with exclusive rights to develop the product. Second, the authority chooses how much of
the benefits of an innovation go to the patent holder. This allocation is affected by rules such as
patent length, patent breadth, and renewal fees.
Most analyses of patent policy focus on the optimal duration and breadth of patent protection1,
but assume that a firm does not receive a patent until its R&D process is complete2. We distinguish
between the stage a patent is granted and the end of the innovation process. This distinction allows
us to evaluate the desirability of races and to analyze the effects of the race length on the pace
and cost of innovation preceding and following a patent. This assumption is consistent with actual
1For example, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), O’Donoghue et al. (1998), Denicolo (1999), Hopenhayn and Mitchell
(2001), Wright (1999), Green and Scotchmer (1995).
2Perry and Vincent (2002) is an exception. See Section 3 for a more thorough comparison of their setup and ours.
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innovation processes. Firms often receive patents for a product in its early development stages,
bear significant expenditures afterwards and reap financial benefits only when R&D is finished and
the product is marketed. This feature is seen in many of the case histories of important inventions
examined in Jewkes et al. (1969). For example, the first patents for xerography were granted
many years before the first copy machine, and far more money was spent on development of the
transistor after the patent was granted than before. When a patent should be granted represents
a fundamental question in the design of patent policy. We show that this choice has important
implications for the costs and benefits of innovation.
In our environment, the patent authority must weigh three considerations. These are the time
at which R&D is completed and the product is ready, the potential waste of a patent race and the
welfare loss in the product market from patent monopolies. If we make the conventional assumption
that no patent is granted until all R&D is completed and choose a long life for the patent, then there
will be much over-investment in the patent race and large welfare loss from the patent monopoly,
but an early product introduction time. The waste in the patent race can be eliminated by an
early grant of the patent or a smaller reward. Decreasing the value of the patent, by lowering
patent length and breadth, will reduce the product market inefficiencies, and reduce the excessive
investment activity, but may lead to poor intertemporal resource allocation in a multistage patent
race. Additionally, it may be difficult to filter out the less efficient firm when patents are granted
early; even firms with larger costs of innovation may find it feasible to compete for a few stages to
obtain a valuable patent. A priori, it is not obvious which effect dominates in choosing the optimal
policy.
We show that both policy instruments, when to award the patent and rewards to the winner,
will generally be used to spur competition and innovation. In most circumstances, under reasonable
assumptions about product markets, it is optimal for a social surplus maximizing patent authority
to grant a patent after considerable progress has been made by the firms. In other words, races are
desirable. They serve two important purposes in our model. First, the patent authority uses races
to motivate innovators when the prize alone cannot, due to inefficiencies or limitations, provide
adequate incentives. Second, a patent race serves as a filtering device. A race is used to increase
the chance that the patent is rewarded to the most efficient innovator.
Another important factor that influences the optimal mix of the two policy instruments is the
preferences of the patent authority. We consider two different specifications – social and consumer
surplus – whereas most analyses in the patent literature focus only on social surplus. We examine
optimal patent policy when the patent authority maximizes consumer surplus because it may
represent the preferences of the median voter who is likely to be a consumer waiting for new goods.
We show that consumer surplus maximizing patent authorities always prefer races, with or without
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product market distortions.
Our choice of patent policy instruments is influenced by existent national patent institutions.
National patent systems are applied uniformly to all inventions and use a small set of tools such as
filing requirements, duration and scope of a patent, and renewal fees.3 Our focus is on the trade-offs
between using a race versus wealth transfers to the winner, so we examine the interaction of two
instruments: when to grant a patent and the value of the patent to the winner. The value of the
patent incorporates other patent policy details such as breadth, duration and scope, therefore we
do not model them separately. We also find that our insights are robust to the addition of other
instruments. For example, we consider the possibility of using an auction to find the more efficient
innovator and avoid excessive transfers to it. We show that when deadweight losses from patent
monopolies and/or patent prizes are significant, races are still part of the optimal patent policy
even when auctions are available. The key fact is that racing is a useful alternative to stimulating
innovative effort when the use of large prizes as an incentive device is limited by their nontrivial
inefficiency costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and elaborates
on the differences between our approach and those contained in related papers. Section 3 lays out
our model of a patent race, describes the patent authority’s problem and presents our analytical
results. Section 4 reports numerical results on the race dynamics. Section 5 displays the optimal
patent policy and provides robustness checks. Section 6 considers the optimal patent policy under
alternative informational assumptions. Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of possible
extensions of the present analysis. All proofs and a detailed description of our numerical method
are included in the Appendices.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature that studies the implications of R&D competition on
the design of optimal patent policy and helps bridge a gap between two distinct lines of research.
The first of these lines focuses on R&D competition, taking patent policy as given. The second
endogenizes patent policy, but largely abstracts from the R&D competition that precedes the award
of the patent.
3Our model can also be used in a procurement context. The main distinction between patent systems and
procurement problems is that in the latter case, the buyer can draw on a much larger set of instruments to give
proper incentives to competitors. For example, the buyer could offer some payments to the loser and could require
some interim reporting to monitor firms’ progress. In procurement problems, each buyer can design an incentive
system that is tailored for the particular product in question. Our focus in this paper is on national patent systems
which use limited set of instruments.
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Early contributions to the first line of research include Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Loury
(1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1981, 1982) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a,b). In
these models, the probability that a firm successfully obtains a patent at each date depends only on
the firm’s current R&D expenditure and not on its past R&D experience. Competition takes place
in “memoryless” or “Poisson” environments (see also the survey article by Reinganum (1989)). This
first generation of models was subsequently extended by Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and
Vickers (1985a,b, 1987) to incorporate learning or experience effects. Throughout, patent policy
was taken as given.
In contrast, contributions to the second line of research, including Nordhaus (1969), Klem-
perer (1990), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, Thisse (1998), Denicolo (1999,
2000), and Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001), Llobet, Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2006), endogenize
the policymaker’s choice of patent length and/or breadth. However, these papers largely abstract
from the R&D races that precede the award of a patent. Rather, they mainly focus on minimizing
post-innovation distortions.
Our paper is at the intersection of these two lines of research. It is complementary to a growing
body of work that studies the effects of patent policy on the strategic interaction between competing
firms. This body of work includes Scotchmer and Green (1990, 1995), Perry and Vincent (2002)
and Fershtman and Markovich (2010). The first paper by Scotchmer and Green focuses upon
the novelty requirement and disclosure aspects of patent law and their implications for the pace of
innovation. Their second paper involves the role of patent licensing in environments with successive
innovations. Both papers consider a truncated R&D phase, with two stages of innovation only.
Fershtman and Markovich (2010) consider multistage races. Their main focus is on comparing
“strong” and “weak” patent regimes. A strong patent regime entails patent protection at the end
of the race and a no-imitation rule on intermediate discoveries. A weak patent regime allows for
imitation of any discovery: intermediate or final. They study the effect of these two different regimes
on firm innovation in a multistage race of a fixed length. We, on the other hand, distinguish between
the stage at which a patent can be awarded and the stage at which an innovation is successfully
completed. In Fershtman and Markovich (2010), races are exogenous and of fixed length. In our
setting, they arise endogenously as a function of the optimal patent policy.
Perry and Vincent (2002) study the design of patent/procurement races when the planner
cannot observe the firms’ innovation stage. The focus is on how to induce the laggard participants
to drop out without distorting other firms’ incentives to invest. We examine similar issues, but our
environment differs from theirs along a few important lines. First, the informational asymmetry
in our model stems from the inability of the planner to observe the cost of investment (i.e. the
type of firm), rather than their innovation state. Second, in our setting, the prize to the winner
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of the patent, which incorporates patent length and breadth, is endogenously determined, whereas
in theirs, it is a parameter. Third, we explicitly incorporate into our model externalities from
monopoly distortions or deadweight loss of taxes used to finance them. This allows us to study the
effectiveness of races in spurring innovation when the ability of the patent authority to use prizes
is limited by these externalities.
Our patent instruments are different from those utilized in multiple innovation settings consid-
ered in O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) and Hopenhayn, Llobet, and Mitchell (2006). In
O’Donoghue et al., the focus is on increasing profits for successive improvements in innovation while
minimizing monopoly distortions. The patent authority is assumed to have several instruments that
control the length and the breadth of the patent. The optimal mixture of these instruments is not
identified, instead two types of policies, with different lengths and breadths are compared in terms
of the effects they have on the diffusion and costs of innovation. In Hopenhayn et al., the focus
is on optimal rewards for successive innovation and a system of buyouts and licensing that can
implement these rewards. Again, the policy instruments are the length and the scope of the patent.
Our model is about a single innovation, not a sequence of innovations. Our main emphasis is on
the role of races. We analyze the innovation phase of a single good, and examine at what stage a
race should be terminated and patent-type protection be given.
Patent races are not the only mechanism for spurring innovation. Research tournaments, where
contestants compete to find the innovation with the highest value to the sponsor and receive a
prespecified prize, can be and are used to achieve a similar goal. Research tournaments are partic-
ularly useful when research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by
courts. Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999) are amongst the papers that study such tour-
naments, the former in an environment with identical firms, the latter with firms of heterogenous
ability. Innovation races and research tournaments differ both in institutional and model details.
In a single, well-defined innovation race, the quality requirement is fixed, the time of innovation
is variable. The focus in on the pace of innovation and the competition between the firms. In a
research tournament, quality is variable, the terminal date, on the other hand, is fixed. In research
tournaments, the emphasis is on the quality of the product, not on the pace of innovation. In the
McAfee-Fullerton model, an entry auction filters out less efficient firms, in our model, filtering is
mostly achieved by varying the quality requirement, even when auctions are available. Our goal
is to endogenize the choice of races and to study the changes in the innovation pace and intensity
when quality requirements and prizes are chosen optimally. Thus we find patent races to be the
most natural environments in which to achieve this goal.4
4See Scotchmer (1999) for an environment in which the patent system is optimal. She shows that if a direct
mechanism cannot use ex-post information on value or costs, the only feasible incentive mechanisms are patent
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3 A Model of Patent Policy for Multistage R&D Processes
We use a multistage stochastic innovation race model to evaluate patent policies. The introduction
of a new product requires the completion of N stages of development by profit-maximizing firms
that differ in their cost of R&D effort. We assume that each firm controls a separate innovation
process. They have perfect information about each other’s cost structure and position and choose
their investment levels simultaneously. Each firm begins at stage 0 and the firm that first reaches the
stage D ≤ N obtains exclusive rights to continue. The value of D corresponds to filing requirements
for a patent. After winning the race, the patentholder completes the final N −D stages without
competition. When the patentholder reaches stage N , the patentholder markets the new product
and earns the rents from a patent monopoly.
We use D to represent a firm’s effort before it receives a patent relative to the total effort
required to produce a marketable good. Our model calibrates costs so that D/N roughly represents
the fraction of total expected cost incurred before a patent is granted. It is clear that D is neither
0 nor N in most patent systems: for most industries substantial expenditures occur before and
after patents are granted. For example, pharmaceutical firms bear large R&D cost before receiving
patents, but most also spend large sums on proving the safety and efficacy of any drug after receiving
the patent. Our environment allows us to analyze the trade-off between extended monopoly power
given to a patent recipient if D = 0 and the cost of duplicated effort in a long race if D = N . We
also examine how the choice of D affects the other parameters of patent policy.
A patent granting authority (hereafter, PGA), who cannot continuously monitor all races and
has imperfect information about the cost structures of firms involved, chooses the rules that govern
races. Consistent with real patent systems, we assume that the PGA has only two policy tools: Ω,
the prize to the patentholder, and D, the stage at which a patent is awarded. If D = 0, then there
is no race. It also represents the case where the patent requirements are so minor that the patent
goes to whomever, with trivial effort, first comes up with the barest notion of the innovation. In
the game, it formally corresponds to the PGA giving the patent at random to one of the firms. The
key assumption is that in this case each firm has equal chance of winning without having made any
investment. The prize, on the other hand, may be literally a cash prize or, like a patent, it may be
a grant of a monopoly which produces a profit flow with present value Ω. In the latter case, Ω is
meant to represent many features of a patent. For example, Ω is small if the patent life is short or
if it has small breadth, or if renewal fees are large. We tacitly assume that patent breadth, length,
renewal fee rules that are associated with a specific Ω have already been determined by the PGA.
We next model the post-innovation market. We let B denote the potential value to society from
renewals systems with fees.
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the invention. This includes the potential social surplus of a new good as well as any technological
or knowledge spillover into other markets. The allocation of social benefits B is affected by patent
policies. Figure 1 displays the per-period allocation before the patent has expired. Suppose that
demand is given by DD and that there is a constant marginal cost of production. Figure 1 as-
sumes that the patentholder can sell the new good at the monopoly price, but not engage in price
discrimination, creating a profit Pf for the firm and leaving consumers with a surplus of CS. The
area H represents the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.
Figure 1: Division of Social Value
H
Monopoly
Price
Marginal
Cost
D
D
Pf
CS
Once the patent has expired, the good is assumed to sell competitively at marginal cost, implying
that consumers will receive all the social benefits, which equal CS +Pf +H. Profits from patents
are proportional to demand, and, therefore, roughly proportional to social benefits B. Hence we
assume that the prize to the patentholder is Ω = γB; it equals a proportion γ of the present value
of potential social benefit.
In Figure 1, the deadweight loss H represents the social cost of monopoly profits in the patent
system.5 More generally, we assume that the deadweight loss is proportional to the profits received
by the innovator, and is equal to θΩ = θγB for some θ ≥ 0. For example, θ = 0.5 in Figure
1. This linear specification for the deadweight loss captures the basic point that γ > 0 causes
inefficiencies, and is an exact description of this loss when demand is linear and marginal costs
are constant, as well as, when demand has constant elasticity and marginal cost is zero. There
5Price controls may be used to reduce the deadweight loss, but they would also reduce monopoly profits and the
prize. Long-lived patents increase γ but at the expense of increasing the total deadweight losses of monopoly. Cash
prizes may be granted by the PGA along with shorter duration patents. This reduces the time during which the
market experiences the deadweight loss H, but it only creates other inefficiencies since society bears the distortionary
cost of the taxes used to finance the prize. Therefore, there are inefficiencies no matter what financing scheme is
used.
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are similar inefficiencies when Ω is a cash prize financed by distortionary taxes. In that case, θ
represents the marginal efficiency cost of funds, a number which can plausibly be as low as 0.1 or
as high as 1, depending on estimates of various elasticities, tax policy parameters, and the source
of marginal funds; see Judd (1987) for a discussion of these factors. Therefore, the θ parameter
represents either the relation between deadweight loss and profits for monopoly or the marginal
efficiency cost of tax revenue.
While any patent is in effect, the firm receives profits, the consumers receive some benefit, but
some of B is wasted in the transfer process. We assume that the patentholder’s profits are γB but
that the deadweight loss due to inefficiencies is θγB, leaving consumers with B − γB − θγB.
We consider two different specifications of the PGA’s preferences: social and consumer surplus.
Most analyses assume that social surplus is the appropriate objective, but it is not clear that
this should always hold. For example, in a procurement context one suspects that the PGA does
not care about the profits of the participants in the race. Also, some argue that Congress should
choose patent policy to maximize social surplus, but it is also imaginable that Congress will consider
maximizing consumers’ welfare if the median voter is more of a consumer than a producer. Social
surplus, denoted by WS(D, γ; θ,B), is equal to the present discounted value of the social benefit,
B, minus the deadweight losses of transfers to the patentholder, θΩ, and minus the total investment
expenditures of all innovators in the patent race. Consumer surplus WC(D, γ; θ,B), on the other
hand, is equal to the present discounted value of the social benefit, B, minus the transfers to the
patentholder and its associated deadweight loss: (1 − γ)B − θΩ. The precise statements of the
PGA’s objectives are stated in Appendix B.3, along with our numerical method that solves for the
optimal policy.
There may be ways other than a patent race to encourage R&D, but those alternatives typically
cause inefficiencies. For example, a government could give a prize to an inventor, but then insist that
it should be produced in a competitive market. This would avoid the monopoly inefficiencies of a
patent, but at the cost of distortionary taxation to finance the prize. Similar concerns would apply
to government financed research labs. Furthermore, most R&D takes place outside of government
sponsored programs. Our analysis of the PGA’s problem takes into account the inefficiencies of the
PGA’s choices.
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3.1 The Firms: A Multistage Model of Racing
The patent race with a specific Ω and D creates a dynamic game between two firms.6 Let xi,t denote
firm i’s stage at time t. We assume that each firm starts at stage 0; therefore, x1,0 = x2,0 = 0. If
firm i is at stage n then it can either stay at n or advance to n+1, where the probability of jumping
to n + 1 depends on firm i’s investment, denoted ai ∈ A = [0, A¯] ⊂ R+.7 The upper bound A¯ on
investment is chosen sufficiently large so that it never binds in equilibrium. Firm i’s state evolves
according to
xi,t+1 =
{
xi,t, with probability p(xi,t|ai,t, xi,t)
xi,t+1, with probability p(xi,t + 1|ai,t, xi,t).
There are many functional forms we could use for p (x|a, x). We choose a probability structure
so that innovation resembles search and sampling. Let F (x|x) = p (x|1, x), that is, F (x|x) is the
probability that there is no change in the state if a = 1. For general values of a we assume
p(x|a, x) = F (x|x)a(1)
p(x+ 1|a, x) = 1− F (x|x)a.
This specification is analogous to hiring a people to work for one period and having them work
independently on the problem of moving ahead one stage. While this specification is a special one,
its simple statistical foundation helps us interpret our results.8
During R&D, firm i’s cost function is Ci(a), i = 1, 2. It is assumed to be strictly increasing and
weakly convex in a. For the remainder of the paper, we assume the cost function for firm i takes
the following form
Ci(a) = ciaη, η ≥ 1, ci > 0, i = 1, 2.
Firms discount future costs and revenues at the common rate of β < 1 and maximize their expected
discounted payoffs.
6We focus on the duopoly case for reasons of tractability and ease of exposition. We also believe that the duopoly
case can serve as a valid approximation for the monopolistically competitive markets where most innovations take
place.
7We have computed solutions to our model with firms being able to advance more than one stage in each period.
These changes do not lead to any results that contradict the basic insights of this paper. Computational results with
larger jumps can be obtained from the authors upon request.
8This specification allows only forward movement. This is typical of most of the patent race literature, although
exceptions are present. See Doraszelski (2003) for a model with “forgetting”, that is, xt+1 may be less than xt.
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3.2 Equilibrium
The patent race involves two phases. When one of the firms reaches stage D, it is awarded the patent
and becomes the only innovator. We refer to the subsequent innovation stages as the monopoly
phase and denote it by XM = {D,D + 1, . . . , N}. Prior to the monopoly phase the position of the
two firms is described by x = (x1, x2). We refer to the set of states before the patent is granted
as the duopoly phase and denote it by XD = {(x1, x2)|xi ∈ {0, ..., D} , i = 1, 2} . Since we employ
backward induction to solve for the equilibrium of the game, we first solve for the monopoly phase
and then for the duopoly phase.
3.2.1 Monopoly Phase
Firm i precedes as a monopoly after it receives the patent. We formulate firm i’s monopoly problem
recursively. At the terminal stage N , the innovation process is over and firm i receives a prize of
Ω. In stages D through N − 1, it spends resources on investment. Let VMi (xi) denote the value
function of firm i if it is a monopoly in state xi. VMi solves the Bellman equation
VMi (xi) = max
ai∈A
−Ci(ai) + β ∑
x′i≥xi
p(x′i|ai, xi)VMi (x′i)
 , D ≤ xi < N
VMi (N) = Ω.(2)
The policy function aMi of a firm i monopolist is defined by
(3) aMi (xi) = arg max
ai∈A
−Ci(ai) + β ∑
x′i≥xi
p(x′i|ai, xi)VMi (x′i)
 , D ≤ xi < N.
Proposition 1. Firm i’s monopoly problem at state xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N} has a unique optimal
solution aMi (xi). The value function V
M
i and the policy function a
M
i are nondecreasing in the
state xi.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.2.2 Duopoly Phase
We formulate the competition between the firms before stage D as a duopoly game. In the analysis
of this game we restrict attention to Markov strategies. A pure Markov strategy σi : XD → A
for firm i is a mapping from the state space X to its investment set A. We define the firms’ value
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functions recursively. Let Vi(x) represent the value of firm i’s value function if the two firms are in
state x = (x1, x2) ∈ XD. We use the conventional notation that x−i (a−i) denote the state (action)
of firm i’s opponent. If at least one of the firms has reached the patent stage D, firm i’s value
function is defined as follows:
(4) Vi(x) =

VMi (xi), for x−i < xi = D
VMi (xi)/2, for xi = x−i = D
0, for xi < x−i = D.
If neither firm has received the patent, the Bellman equations for the two firms are defined by
(5) Vi(x) = max
ai∈A
−Ci(ai) + β ∑
x′i,x
′
−i
p(x′i|ai, xi)p(x′−i|a−i, x−i)Vi(x′i, x′−i)
 , x1, x2 < D.
The optimal strategy functions of the firms must satisfy
(6) σi(x) = arg max
ai∈A
−Ci(ai) + β
∑
x
′
i,x
′
−i
p(x′i|ai, xi)p(x′−i|a−i, x−i)Vi(x′i, x′−i)
 , x1, x2 < D.
We now define the Markov perfect equilibrium of the race.
Definition 1. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of value functions Vi, i = 1, 2, and
a pair of strategy functions σ∗i , i = 1, 2, such that
1. Given σ∗−i, the value function Vi solves the Bellman equation (5), i = 1, 2.
2. Given the value functions Vi, and the strategy function of his opponent, the strategy function
σ∗i for player i solves equation (6), i = 1, 2.
A Markov perfect equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 1. There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.3 A Special Case: Linear Technology, Identical Firms, No Deadweight Loss
Before we proceed with the analysis of our general model, we discuss a simple, canonical example
with linear technology, identical firms, and no deadweight loss associated with the prize. In this
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special case, which serves as a useful benchmark, there is obviously no value to a race since the
PGA’s problem can be perfectly internalized in a firm’s profit maximizing strategy. If the PGA
awards the project to one firm with the full social value as the prize before any of the firms start
investing (i.e. D = 0), then the firm’s profits equal social surplus and the firm chooses the socially
optimal investment level. A race would speed up innovation but lead to excessive investment.
Proposition 2. If costs are identical and linear (c = c2/c1 = 1 and η = 1), transfers to the patent
winner have no deadweight loss (θ = 0), and the PGA maximizes social surplus, then the optimal
policy sets γ = 1 and D = 0, implying no race.
Proposition 2 serves as a useful benchmark, but relies on the assumption that monopolies have
no efficiency costs or that taxes paid to the innovator have no distortionary cost, in addition to
assuming homogeneous firms with a linear technology. If firms are heterogeneous, the planner may
prefer a race to ensure that the more efficient firm is not eliminated by bad luck. If firms have
(strictly) convex costs, the planner may also prefer a race since two firms can achieve a rate of total
innovation more cheaply than each can do individually. As we have stressed in the introduction,
we are interested in examining optimal patent rules when inefficiencies and distortions are present,
and when firms are heterogeneous. These more important and relevant cases do not admit closed
form solutions, unless drastic simplifications such as linear cost and linear probability transition
functions are used. However, the resulting linear model would have equilibria with only boundary
solutions such as zero effort or deterministic transition. We do not find such equilibria to be good
descriptions of the uncertainty that firms face in research and development or representative of
reasonable firm interaction in the context of a race. Therefore, we do not dwell on these extreme
environments, but instead use numerical methods to analyze our more general model.
4 Race and Innovation Dynamics
The purpose of this section is to obtain a good understanding of firms’ behavior in our model. We
begin our analysis by examining the monopolist inventor. Next we analyze the interaction of firms
in a race and how firms’ effort levels change with the conditions of the race, governed by the PGA’s
policy choices.
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4.1 Monopolist Inventor
Proposition 1 states that both the value function VMi and the policy function a
M
i of the monopolist
are nondecreasing in the state xi, that is,
VMi (xi) ≤ VMi (xi + 1), aMi (xi) ≤ aMi (xi + 1) .
Using the same approach as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can also show that both the value and
the policy functions are nonincreasing in the cost coefficient ci of the cost function Ci(a) = ciaη,
η ≥ 1, that is,
∂VMi (xi)
∂ci
≤ 0, ∂a
M
i (xi)
∂ci
≤ 0 .
We illustrate these analytical results for a monopolist with a discount factor β = 0.996, a cost
elasticity η = 1.5, and a transition probability of unit investment F (x|x) = F = 0.5. The firm
must pass N = 5 stages of innovation to obtain a prize derived from the social benefit B = 100. A
model with these parameter values serves as a benchmark throughout this section.
Figures 2 and 3 show the effort levels aMi (xi) and the values V
M
i (xi) for xi = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, as a
function of ci ∈ [1, 10], respectively. The prize proportion, γ, is set to 1 resulting in a patent prize
Ω = γB = 100. The highest curve is for xi = 4, the second highest for xi = 3 and so on. The
bottom curve shows the respective values for the initial state xi = 0. As predicted by the analytical
results, the closer the monopolist inventor comes to the completion of the product, the higher are
its value and effort. Similarly, both the value and the effort level decrease in the cost coefficient ci.
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These simple observations have an important implication for the design of optimal patent policy.
The PGA has the ability to award the project to one firm before any of the firms start investing.
That is, the PGA can set D = 0 and randomly award the patent to one firm which then acts as a
monopolist inventor. If the firms have identical cost functions, then it does not matter which firm
receives the patent. But if one firm possesses a more efficient technology and has lower cost, then the
PGA would prefer to give the patent to this firm. However, the PGA cannot distinguish between the
firms, hence a choice ofD = 0 does not allow for the selection of the more efficient firm. In fact, there
is a 50 percent chance that the less efficient firm will receive the patent. Therefore, setting D = 0
becomes increasingly unattractive to the PGA as the cost heterogeneity among the competitors
increases. To illustrate this effect, consider two firms with cost coefficients c1 = 1 and c2 = 5. If the
more efficient Firm 1 receives the patent and gets to act as a monopolist inventor, then it obtains
a value of VM1 (0) = 87.7 and shows an effort of a
M
1 (0) = 0.561 in state 0. If the less efficient Firm
2 receives the patent, then its corresponding values are considerably smaller, VM2 (0) = 70.1 and
aM2 (0) = 0.204. The higher cost and lower effort of Firm 2 lead simultaneously to higher total cost
of innovation (e.g., c1aM1 (0) < c2a
M
2 (0)) and to slower innovation (e.g., 1−F a
M
1 (0) > 1−F aM2 (0), see
expression (1)). Both effects then result in the much smaller value VM2 (0). The expected value of a
random patent award (which would also equal the expected producer surplus and social surplus) is
then (VM1 (0) + V
M
2 (0))/2 = 78.9. Clearly the random award leads to a considerably smaller social
surplus than an award to the efficient firm.
The numerical illustration of the analytical results regarding the monopolist explains why D = 0
may be an attractive policy choice for the PGA when firms have (nearly) identical cost, but becomes
a less attractive option as the cost heterogeneity increases.
4.2 Duopolist Inventors
We now study the dynamic competition between the firms in a patent race and how the PGA’s
patent policy choices affect this competition. We first show the investment choices of the firms for a
fixed patent policy. We then discuss the effect of the different policy choices on the firms’ behavior
along the innovation path. The firms’ response to these choices provide intuition for the tradeoffs
the PGA faces in setting the patent policy. The complexity of this response highlights the need for
a computational approach for analyzing our model.
Throughout the following discussion the social benefit is set to B = 100 and the cost coefficient
of Firm 1 is c1 = 1 as in the benchmark case.
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4.2.1 Firms’ Investment Choices
The first set of graphs depicts the firms’ investment choices along the innovation path of states 0
to 4 for two different values of c = c2/c1 = c2: c = 1 and c = 4. The patent policy is fixed at
D = N and γ = 1, that is, the patent is only given after the completion of the final product and
the prize to the patentholder is the entire social benefit, B. Figure 4 displays the investment effort
of Firm 2 when firms’ cost functions are identical. There are several notable features. First, the
individual level of effort is more than 5 times that of the monopolist inventor’s shown in Figure
2. Second, effort is higher when there is close competition, i.e. when firms are in identical or close
states. Third, along the diagonal, firms increase their effort as they approach the patent award
stage D. Thus the investment levels are highest in state (4, 4). Finally, even in a symmetric cost
race, when one firm gains a sufficient lead, the other firm effectively exits the race by reducing its
effort close to 0 as apparent in states (3, 1) and (4, 1).9
Figure 5 shows the investment effort of Firm 2 when c = 4. Like the symmetric case, Firm 2
effort is at its lowest when Firm 1 takes a substantial lead. It is at its highest when Firm 2 is one
step ahead of Firm 1, close to D. Intuitively, the less efficient firm has a higher chance of winning
the patent award if it is close to the “finish line” D and it’s ahead. In such a situation, Firm 2
increases its effort.10
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Figure 5: Asymmetric cost: c = 4
The previous graphs show the dynamics of firm investment for the fixed patent policy, γ =
9 This is the famous “preemption” result prevalent in the patent race literature.
10 For c larger than 4, Firm 2 would need a larger lead close to D to have a good chance of winning the race. In
those situations, Firm 2 effort is at its highest level when the firm is 2 or 3 steps ahead of Firm 1 and close to D.
These results are omitted for space considerations, but can be obtained from the authors.
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1, D = N = 5. We now investigate the effect of a change in the policy on firm effort and social
surplus. The first result concerns the effect of the patent prize, γ, on the firms’ investment effort,
displayed in Figure 6. The patent award stage D continues to be fixed at N . The investment effort
shown is for state (0, 0), the beginning of the race. The dashed lines represent Firm 2 effort and
the solid lines represent Firm 1 effort. Figure 6 shows that regardless of the value of c, investment
effort is decreasing in γ. Firms respond to a lower patent prize by investing less to reduce their
cost. The response of firms’ investment effort to γ is the same for all other symmetric states of
innovation and for all race lengths, D.11
Figure 6 also shows that firms lower their investment effort in state (0,0) as c becomes sufficiently
high. At these levels of c, Firm 2 finds it difficult to compete with Firm 1 and effectively drops out
of the race. Thus, the race dissolves into a monopolist innovation process by Firm 1.
Figure 6: Duopoly Investment levels, for D = N = 5 and γ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1.0}
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4.2.2 PGA’s Policies and Innovation Dynamics
Based on the previous results, we have argued that firm investment is monotonic in γ for all D,
for all cost asymmetry c, and state of innovation (x1, x2). The effect of γ on social surplus is more
complex. Figure 7 shows the social surplus for a variety of γ and c with D fixed at N . It is clear
that social surplus is not always monotonic in γ. If firms have similar costs, they compete fiercely
11Figures showing effect of γ on investment have been omitted from the text to conserve space, but are available
from the authors.
18 OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES
(as shown in Figure 4), hence a large prize Ω = γB leads to excessive investment and lower social
surplus. As γ decreases, firms reduce their investment efforts. Although the resulting cost savings
are slightly offset by slower innovation, the net impact is an increase in social surplus.12 As a result,
for small c values and D > 0, the PGA would prefer to reduce investment effort by setting a low
prize, γ.
As c increases further, it becomes more expensive for Firm 2 to invest. Reducing γ for these
values of c exacerbates this problem. By exerting lower effort, Firm 2 lessens the competition Firm
1 faces. Firm 1 responds by decreasing its own effort, innovation slows down, and social surplus
decreases as a result. (See Figure 7 for c = 3). At these levels of c, an intermediate level of γ is
preferred by the PGA because it restores some competition and faster innovation, without leading
to massive duplication of effort. Firm 1 invests more, but Firm 2 effectively exits the race as soon
as it falls behind.
Figure 7: Social Surplus for D=N=5 and γ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1.0}
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As c continues to rise (See Figure 7 for c > 6), Firm 2 drops out of the race for any prize γ,
allowing Firm 1 to continue as a monopolist. To ensure that Firm 1 completes the innovation in a
timely manner, a higher γ, in particular γ = 1 as in the monopolist inventor case, is needed.
The impact of the interaction between c and γ on social surplus, displayed by Figure 7 for
D = 5, is qualitatively the same for all D > 0. The question remains, given the two instruments,
12 Obviously, as γ tends to zero the firms stop investing and social surplus also tends to zero. Thus, social surplus
is not monotone in γ.
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Figure 8: Social Surplus
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γ and D, what is the policy that maximizes social surplus? Figure 8 shows the social surplus for
optimally chosen γ, for different D. The maximized social surplus is the upper envelope of the six
lines. The optimal policy has a bang-bang feature. It involves no races until c reaches 2.13 (marked
by the vertical dashed line) and full-length races thereafter. When firms are similar, they naturally
compete fiercely, hence allowing them to race for a patent leads to excessive investment. Therefore
until c = 2.13, the PGA prefers to flip a coin for the patent and let the winner invest without
competition. At these low values of c, expected social surplus from a random patent assignment is
higher than expected social surplus from a race with over-investment.
As c increases, Firm 2 finds it too costly to compete strongly, which leads to reduced effort,
which in turn, results in less over-investment during a race. At the same time, the loss in social
surplus associated with picking the inefficient firm at D = 0, increases. Therefore once c becomes
large enough (c ≥ 2.14 in Figure 8), a race is preferred to no race. More specifically, a race with
D = N delivers a higher social surplus than a race of any other length. The reason for this result is
the following. The PGA prefers timely innovation by the efficient firm. Spurring innovation can be
achieved two ways: one, by increasing the prize, γ and two, by decreasing D so that firms compete
fiercely in the early stages of the race. However, lowering D increases the chances of the inefficient
firm to win the race. Therefore the PGA uses a long race to filter out the inefficient firm. It uses
the prize γ to fine-tune firm effort, so that the product is available in a timely manner without
excessive over-investment. Table 1 shows how the social-surplus maximizing γ changes with c.
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Table 1: Optimal policy choice γ conditional on c, for D = 5
c 1 1.5 2 3 4 6 8 10
γ 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.35 0.48 0.72 0.92 1.00
Table 2: Parameter Values
β = 0.996 discount factor
N = 5 number of stages of innovation
B = 100 total social benefit
η ∈ {1, 1.5} elasticity of cost
θ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.4, 1.0} deadweight loss parameter
c ∈ {1, 1.25, ..., 4.75, 5, 6, ..., 20} ratio of firms’ costs coefficients, c2/c1. (c1 = 1)
F (x|x) = 0.5 transition probability for unit investment
Our results so far have focused on the firms’ reaction to different PGA choices of γ and D in
the absence of product market distortions. We now turn our attention to optimal patent policies
when the inefficiency costs of prizes are positive. We also consider optimal patent policies under
consumer surplus maximization and under alternative innovation technologies.
5 Optimal Patent Rules
We now show optimal patent rule results when rewards have inefficiencies, firms are heterogenous
and technologies are allowed to be non-linear. Table 2 displays the set of parameters for our
reported results.
These parameter values represent a wide range of cases. We make two normalizations: c1 = 1
and F (x|x) = .5. We report detailed results from a 5-stage race only. Races with more stages do
not provide any additional insights or change our qualitative results. The θ values are motivated
by inefficiency costs of monopoly for standard demand curves and by the excess burden results in
Judd (1987). The value of B is chosen so that races are neither too short nor too long. In general,
the parameter values in Table 2 are chosen to represent innovation processes lasting from several
months to a few years.
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5.1 Social Surplus Maximizing Patent Rules
We now examine the case of social surplus maximization and the impact of cost heterogeneity and
deadweight losses on optimal patent rules. Throughout this and subsequent sections, we use the
term short (long) race to describe a patent awarded at a lower (higher) innovation stage. The terms
slow and quick are used to describe the time it takes for firms to complete the innovation.
We first examine the effect of deadweight losses on optimal patent rules. To isolate this effect,
we assume linear and homogeneous costs, as in Proposition 2. In this case, the only reason for
having a race and bearing the inefficiency costs of duplicated effort is to reduce the deadweight
loss associated with the patent prize. Figure 9 displays the social surplus as the deadweight loss
parameter θ increases. The D = 0 line displays social welfare when one of the two identically
efficient firms receives the patent in stage 0 and the prize γ is set to its optimal value. The D = 4
line displays social welfare when the patent goes to the first firm to reach that stage. Figure 9
shows that when θ is small, the planner prefers innovation with a monopolist as in the special case
studied in Proposition 2. When θ exceeds 0.25, however, the planner switches to using a race. Note
that θ = 0.25 is a small value for deadweight losses; for a monopolist with a linear demand curve,
θ = 0.50. To see why the planner switches to a race as θ increases, consider the impact of θ on the
optimal prize γ∗. It is clear from Figure 9 that for a fixed D, γ∗ decreases as θ increases: larger
distortionary costs lead to smaller prizes. Smaller prizes reduce monopolist investment levels and
hence the speed of innovation. Therefore as θ increases, the PGA prefers races and the competition
they spur to stimulate innovation.
We next add firm heterogeneity, and consider both linear and strictly convex costs. Table 3
reports, for a variety of θ values, the optimal prize and D, and the associated social surplus for
different cost asymmetries, in both linear and convex cost cases.
The case with η = 1.5 and θ = 0 is the case displayed in Figure 8 and discussed in detail in
Section 4.2.2. For the other cases, there are multiple important results to note.
1. Social surplus, WS , is decreasing in θ.
2. The optimal prize γ∗ is weakly decreasing in θ for a fixed cost asymmetry c.
3. In the linear cost case, for c high enough, all positive D deliver the same social surplus.
4. For θ ≥ 0.25, regardless of the c value, the optimal policy always involves races, both in linear
and in convex cost environments.
The intuition behind results (1) and (2) is straightforward, given the PGA’s preferences. Result
(3) is linked to the only difference between the linear and non-linear cost cases. In the linear cost
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Table 3: Optimal Patent Policy for B = 100, β = 0.996
η = 1.5 η = 1.0
θ c D∗ γ∗ WS D∗ γ∗ WS
0 1.0 0 1.00 87.7 0 1.00 86.3
1.2 0 1.00 87.1 0 1.00 85.4
1.5 0 1.00 86.2 0 1.00 84.0
1.75 0 1.00 85.5 5 0.22 84.5
2.0 0 1.00 84.9 5 0.28 85.0
2.5 5 0.28 85.2 5 0.36 85.5
4.0 5 0.48 86.8 5 0.66 86.2
0.1 1.0 0 0.34 83.0 0 0.26 82.4
1.2 5 0.12 82.3 5 0.14 81.7
1.5 5 0.16 82.1 5 0.18 82.3
1.75 5 0.18 82.2 5 0.22 82.5
2.0 5 0.20 82.4 5 0.26 82.5
2.5 5 0.24 82.9 3 0.26 82.4
4.0 4 0.32 83.0 * 0.26 82.4
0.25 1.0 5 0.10 81.3 3 0.12 79.7
1.2 5 0.12 80.7 5 0.12 79.8
1.5 5 0.14 80.2 3 0.16 79.9
1.75 4 0.14 80.0 4 0.20 79.6
2.0 4 0.16 79.9 2 0.20 79.6
2.5 4 0.18 79.9 * 0.18 79.5
4.0 3 0.22 79.7 * 0.18 79.5
0.4 1.0 5 0.10 79.9 4 0.10 78.2
1.2 5 0.10 79.3 5 0.12 78.2
1.5 4 0.12 78.6 2 0.14 77.9
1.75 4 0.14 78.2 * 0.14 77.3
2.0 3 0.12 78.0 * 0.14 77.3
2.5 3 0.14 77.8 * 0.14 77.3
4.0 2 0.16 77.2 * 0.14 77.3
1.0 1.0 5 0.08 75.5 4 0.10 72.8
1.2 5 0.08 74.6 1 0.10 71.9
1.5 3 0.08 73.3 2 0.12 70.5
1.75 3 0.10 72.7 * 0.12 70.5
2.0 3 0.10 72.3 * 0.12 70.5
2.5 2 0.10 71.6 * 0.12 70.5
4.0 2 0.12 70.6 * 0.12 70.5
* indicates that WS is the same for all D > 0
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Figure 9: Policy tradeoffs with linear and identical costs.
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case, when c is high enough, Firm 2 exits the race. As long as there is a race, all D values deliver
the same social surplus because Firm 1 proceeds as a monopolist inventor from the beginning. In
the convex cost case, Firm 2’s effort is always positive, no matter how disadvantaged it is compared
to Firm 1. Therefore, even though the race turns into an “effective” monopoly invention process
at high c, social surplus slightly varies with D and the indifference result does not hold.
The intuition behind result (4) is as follows. The presence of deadweight loss associated with
prizes constrains the ability of the PGA to use them effectively to spur innovation. For example,
observe that for θ ≥ 0.25, the optimal γ never exceeds 0.2 in Table 3. The constraint on γ forces
the PGA to use D as an instrument to motivate competition instead. At high c values, when a
low γ is not enough to induce Firm 2 to remain as a viable threat to Firm 1, a lower D pushes
both firms to increase investment effort, by raising Firm 2’s chances to win the race. However, if
D is too low, then Firm 2 may win the race. The optimal choice of D represents a careful balance
between filtering on the one hand, and fast innovation on the other hand.13
Our results so far indicate that if deadweight losses associated with monopolies or prizes are not
included in the analysis, optimal patent rules display a bang-bang feature: they involve a sudden
switch from no race to a full-length race as firm diversity increases (See the switch from D∗ = 0
to D∗ = 5 in the θ = 0 case, both for η = 1.0 and η = 1.5.). In contrast, when deadweight losses
13 The reason the convex cost case features longer races relative to the linear cost case has to do with effort levels
less than one. At these effort levels, innovation costs are smaller and hence races are longer in the convex cost case.
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are explicitly considered, and they are of a reasonable magnitude, the optimal patent rule never
involves a coin flip, it always features a race. The PGA prefers to grant patents at middle stages
of development and give small prizes (See patent policy for c > 1.5 and θ ≥ 0.25). This suggests
that patents should be easier to obtain, but less valuable.
5.2 Consumer Surplus Maximizing Patent Rules
We next examine optimal patent rules when the planner maximizes consumer surplus. In this
case, the cost of innovation does not enter the PGA’s objective function, so the PGA is only
concerned about the duration of the race and the fraction of the benefit that consumers can retain.
A reduction of the prize to the innovator increases consumer benefits, but slows down the arrival
of the innovation. One way to relieve this tension is to use races to stimulate investment.
Figure 10 displays the optimal prize parameter γ∗ and consumer surplus WC(·) as a function of
the cost ratio c for θ = 0. Each line corresponds to a different D. The maximized consumer surplus
is the upper envelope of the four lines in the figures.
Figure 10: Consumer surplus, θ = 0.0
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Several patterns are apparent in Figure 10. Consumer surplus decreases as the cost asymmetry
rises. At small cost ratios the PGA can rely on the intense competition among the firms to
ensure that the firms innovate quickly. Since the competition provides ample motivation for high
investment levels, the PGA can set the prize-to-benefit ratio γ to be very low and the patent stage
to D = N = 5. As c rises, the intensity of competition decreases since the inefficient firm reduces
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investment. The PGA remedies this by increasing γ and by choosing a lower D. These changes spur
both firms to work harder in the duopoly phase without creating too much risk that the inferior
firm wins. In Figure 10, γ∗ increases from 0.10 to 0.12 and D∗ decreases from 5 to 2. As c increases
further, even a short duopoly phase is not enough to motivate the firms. Since the PGA is reluctant
to increase γ, the race becomes, for all practical purposes, just a monopoly innovation process by
the more efficient firm. Thus the PGA is indifferent between setting D to any value between 1 to
N .
Table 4 displays results for sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameters η, c and θ and
confirms that the following result displayed in Figure 10 is robust to changes in θ and η: Consumer
surplus is decreasing in c. Table 4 also reveals these additional results:
1. The optimal patent policy always involves a race, i.e. D∗ > 0.
2. As in the social surplus case, γ∗ is weakly decreasing in θ for a fixed c.
3. The optimal prize, γ∗, is always smaller than in the case of social surplus.
4. The optimal patent granting stage, D∗, is weakly decreasing in θ, regardless of c.
The intuition behind result (4), i.e. the pattern of the D∗ values, is as follows. As the cost of
investment for Firm 2 increases, its investment level declines; Firm 2 poses less of a competitive
threat to Firm 1. In order to motivate both firms, the PGA lowers the optimal patent stage D∗, but
this policy only partially motivates the firms to choose higher investment levels. When the cost of
innovation is linear in investment effort and the cost ratio is sufficiently large, Firm 2 exits the race.
Consequently, the probability of this firm advancing is zero, and the PGA is indifferent between
all D > 0. When the cost function is strictly convex, Firm 2 never chooses a zero investment level
since C ′(0) = 0, and always has a positive chance of reaching D∗ = 1 before Firm 1. As a result,
D∗ is always greater than 1. As in the social surplus case, this result highlights the only difference
between strictly convex and linear cost.
5.3 Auctions for Allocating Patent Rights
Our previous results have shown that races arise endogenously in our environment. In this section,
we enlarge the set of instruments available to the PGA by allowing it to choose an auction for
innovation. The question is whether the PGA would prefer an auction to deliver the socially
valuable product as opposed to a race and if yes, under what circumstances.
Suppose the PGA holds a second-price sealed-bid auction for the patent rights with a prize of
Ω = γB. The PGA’s payoff from an auction of patent rights before any investment or innovation
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Table 4: Optimal Patent Policy for B = 100, β = 0.996
η = 1.5 η = 1.0
θ c D∗ γ∗ WC D∗ γ∗ WC
0 1 5 0.10 80.7 4 0.10 81.0
1.5 3 0.10 78.2 1 0.14 78.3
2 3 0.12 76.4 * 0.12 77.9
3 2 0.12 74.9 * 0.12 77.9
0.25 1 5 0.08 78.7 4 0.10 78.8
1.5 3 0.10 76.0 * 0.10 75.3
2 2 0.10 74.1 * 0.10 75.3
3 2 0.10 72.3 * 0.10 75.3
0.4 1 5 0.08 77.7 4 0.10 77.4
1.5 3 0.10 74.7 * 0.10 74.0
2 2 0.10 72.8 * 0.10 74.0
3 2 0.10 71.1 * 0.10 74.0
1 1 5 0.06 73.7 4 0.10 72.0
1.5 3 0.08 70.6 * 0.10 68.9
2 2 0.08 68.7 * 0.10 68.9
3 2 0.08 66.3 * 0.10 68.9
* indicates that WC is the same for all D > 0
takes place is the following:
(7) PAuc(γ;α,Ci, Cj,θ) = max
γ
{WAuc(i, 0) + VMj (0) + α(VMi (0)− VMj (0))},
where WAuc(i, 0) is the time t = 0 expected present discounted consumer surplus from the inno-
vation when firm i is the innovator. It is formally defined as:
WAuc(i, xi) = β
∑
x′i≥xi
p(x′i|aMi (xi) , xi)WAuc(i, x′i), 0 ≤ xi < N,
WAuc(i,N) = (1− γ)B − θγB.
The values VMi (0) and V
M
j (0) represent the private values of the patent to firm i and j respectively,
and are equal to the monopolist inventors’ values.
The parameter α is the Pareto weight placed on the firms, and is set to 0 when the PGA
maximizes consumer surplus and to 1 in the case of social surplus maximization. In a second
price auction where the winning firm pays the second bid, it is a well known result that the
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dominant strategy for each firm is to bid exactly its expected net present value of the patent.
In our environment, these private values are equal to the monopoly values for each firm. Under
such a bidding strategy, the more efficient firm, Firm 1, would always win the patent. Therefore
auctions can be very effective instruments for filtering out inefficient firms. However, when prizes
are constrained, as in the case of reasonable θ values, auctions continue to be effective at filtering,
but not so effective at spurring timely innovation. Races may dominate auctions in these cases.
Tables 5 and 6 report the optimal policy (including auctions as instruments) for a social sur-
plus maximizing and consumer surplus maximizing PGA, respectively. Firms are assumed to be
identical. The tables make it clear that given a choice between two mechanisms – auctions and
patent races – the PGA would prefer auctions only when θ is low. When θ is of a more reasonable
magnitude (θ ≥ 0.25 for social surplus and θ ≥ 0.4 for consumer surplus), however, auctions are
dominated by races. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In the auction, a monopo-
list innovator conducts all of the R&D and his rate of investment is below the socially efficient rate,
especially when the prize is low due to higher θ. This leads to slower innovation and lowers the
surplus from the auction. The patent race eases the trade off between the prize and the speed of
innovation. The race itself provides incentives for higher investment and quicker innovation when
the prize is not enough to motivate the firms. With a race of nontrivial duration, the PGA can
achieve faster innovation than the auction can for the same prize. In these cases, the PGA prefers
races.
Table 5: Social Surplus Maximizing Patent Policy for B = 100, β = 0.996, c = 1
η = 1.5 η = 1.0
θ D∗ γ∗ PAuc policy D∗ γ∗ PAuc policy
0.0 1.00 87.7 auction 1.00 86.3 auction
0.10 0.34 83.0 auction 0.26 82.4 auction
0.25 5 0.10 81.3 race 3 0.12 79.7 race
0.4 5 0.10 79.9 race 4 0.10 78.2 race
1.0 5 0.08 75.5 race 4 0.10 72.8 race
In sum, the results from the comparison of patent auctions vs. patent races once again underline
the importance of considering deadweight losses generated in determining the best mechanism for
innovation.
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Table 6: Consumer Surplus Maximizing Patent Policy for B = 100, β = 0.996, c = 1
η = 1.5 η = 1.0
θ D∗ γ∗ PAuc policy D∗ γ∗ PAuc policy
0.0 1.00 87.7 auction 1.00 86.3 auction
0.10 0.34 83.0 auction 0.26 82.4 auction
0.25 0.22 79.4 auction 0.18 79.5 auction
0.4 5 0.08 77.7 race 4 0.10 77.4 race
1.0 5 0.06 73.7 race 4 0.10 72.0 race
6 Optimal Uniform Rules for Heterogeneous Innovations
In the previous sections, we assumed that the PGA knows the exact, ex-ante social value of the
innovation, B. We also assumed that the PGA knows the cost technologies present, but can not
assign them any particular firm. Therefore the PGA could tailor the patent rules to c = c2c1 and B.
14
In reality, patent laws are designed to apply across a broad range of industries and products, as well
as a broad range of technologies and social benefits. To address this issue, we now consider the case
where the PGA’s information about the social value of the invention and the firms’ technologies is
restricted; it only knows the distributions of B and c, as well as their support, but not their exact
values. Specifically, we assume that the PGA’s beliefs about B are given by the probability density
function g(B), that its beliefs about c are represented by the density f(c), and that g(B) and f(c)
are independent. Given these beliefs and its social objective, the PGA maximizes the expected
discounted social surplus,
∑
c,BW
S(D, γ; θ,B)f(c)g(B), or expected discounted consumer surplus∑
c,BW
C(D, γ; θ,B)f(c)g(B).
In order to study this problem, we need to specify f(c) and g(B). We do not aim to execute
a carefully calibrated exercise since the necessary data is not available. However, we do want to
compute some “average” patent rules, illustrate the ease with which we can incorporate this into
our analysis, and demonstrate the robustness of our previous results to this more general case.
Therefore, we use the little data available to construct interesting examples. Pakes (1986) provides
some documentation on the benefits of innovation for some European countries, and shows that
their distribution is highly skewed: most innovations have very little or no social value and a few
14It may be possible to elicit information about a firm’s costs. It may also be possible to hire firms to conduct R&D
under the guidance of some central planner. However, that is not what a patent system does. Our analysis is a long
way from being a fully specified mechanism design analysis; it represents instead the nature of feasible alternatives
within a patent system. Our focus in this paper is on patent races, therefore we abstract from policies that would
allow the PGA to conduct its own research and development by employing the firms in question.
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innovations have very large values. However, these are ex-post realized values on innovations. Since
the patent rules we analyze are chosen before any social value is realized, the relevant data for our
model is the ex-ante distribution of values held by firms when they enter a patent race. Nevertheless,
we assume that Pakes’s empirical evidence represents an approximation for the distribution of ex-
ante social values, so we use highly skewed distributions for B in our numerical results.
The first two rows of Table 7 display the supports for two distributions, B1 and B2, of social
values. The third row presents the probabilities for the possible values of Bi.
Table 7: Distribution of B
Support for B1 10 32.5 57.5 85 120 160 210 277.5 380 600
Support for B2 100 325 575 850 1200 1600 2100 2775 3800 6000
Pr(B) 0.5 0.25 0.125 0.0625 0.0315 0.016 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001
Because we have little data on innovation costs, we study optimal policies under four different
cost distributions. As before, c1 = 1. First, we examine two possible uniform distributions over a
finite set of possible values denoted Z = {z1, .., z9}. The first, denoted U1 assumes zi = 1+(i−1).25.
The second, denoted U2 assumes zi = i. We look at both cases since they represent different
degrees of heterogeneity in costs and different lack of information for the PGA. We do not want the
results to strongly depend on the uniform specification. Therefore, we also consider two triangular
distributions for c. More precisely, these distributions assume that the probability that c = zi
is (10 − i)/45. We look at two possibilities for Z = {z1, .., z9}. The first, denoted T1, is zi =
1 + (i− 1).25, and the second, denoted by T2, is zi = i.
Table 8 reports our results for the social surplus maximizing policy when θ = 0. The two
rightmost columns represent the two possible beliefs about B, and the four bottom rows represent
the four possible beliefs about c. As we move down the table, the mean and variance of the belief
about c increases, and as we move right, the mean and variance of the belief about B increases.
These results confirm the generality of our previous insights. When the PGA maximizes expected
social surplus, and θ = 0, the optimal policy has a bang-bang feature. The PGA chooses no race
with full prize until sufficient variability in firms’ costs is present. Then the optimal rule involves
full length races with a smaller γ∗.
Table 9 reports the consumer surplus maximizing policy when θ = 0. Consistent with our
earlier results, the optimal policy always involves races and small γ∗. The results in Tables 8 and 9
present a few examples, but show that the results from the conditional analyses in Section 5 are
robust to the more general case where the PGA must choose rules that apply over a wide variety
of R&D processes.
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Table 8: Social Surplus: Average Policies (D∗, γ∗), θ = 0
c B1 B2
T1 (0,1) (0,1)
U1 (0,1) (0,1)
T2 (5,0.38) (0,1)
U2 (5,0.40) (5,0.16)
Table 9: Consumer Surplus: Average Policies (D∗, γ∗), θ = 0.
c B1 B2
T1 (3,0.18) (5,0.02)
U1 (3,0.20) (5,0.04)
T2 (3,0.20) (3,0.06)
U2 (2,0.20) (3,0.06)
7 Extensions and Conclusions
Patent races are an integral part of the R&D process, but they do not represent the complete
innovation process. A firm that has been granted a patent typically needs to incur additional costs
and develop the product further before it can be produced and sold. We present an analysis of how
the two parameters of the race – when the patent or exclusive contract is awarded and the winning
prize – should be chosen in a simple multistage race.
We find that races of nontrivial duration are part of an optimal policy under most circumstances.
In our setting, the patent race serves two purposes. First, it motivates the firms to invest and
complete the innovation process quickly. When the prize causes inefficiencies, such as the monopoly
grant implicit in a patent, using a race allows the planner to reduce the size of the prize and still
give firms incentives to invest in innovation. Second, a race filters out inferior innovators since they
cannot keep up with the more efficient ones.
The choice between short and long races depends on the social returns to innovation, the
planner’s objective (social vs. consumer surplus), and the inefficiency costs of compensating the
patent winner. We show that in an environment with reasonably inefficient transfer mechanisms,
longer races are preferred when firms are homogenous and shorter races are chosen otherwise. This
result overturns the conventional wisdom that when firms are likely to compete fiercely, i.e., when
they possess identical technologies in a simultaneous-move race, short races are preferable because
they avoid excessive investment. Our analysis shows that this is true only when there is very little
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constraint on the prizes a patent authority can give.
Our model allows us to understand the fundamental issues of developing a patent policy and
identifying the complex trade-offs a patent authority faces. The environment we consider is a simple
one, but our subsequent work indicates that the results are robust to many possible extensions.
For example, one immediate extension is to consider races where firms can advance more than
one stage at a time. We computed many such examples; they do not provide any substantial
additional insights into the workings of the model. We have also studied cases where the technology
of investment, i.e. the distribution F , depends on the stage of the innovation process. Again, no
additional insights in terms of the trade-offs a patent authority faces were delivered by the modified
technologies.
Another interesting extension is to allow firms to trade their technologies. It is straightforward
to allow firms in our model to negotiate technology trades at each stage, similar to the trades
examined in Green and Scotchmer (1995). In the context of our model, the technology leader may
want to sell its technology to the laggard. We have studied this extension and found it to have no
significant impact on the results for optimal patent policies.
Our results indicate that once a firm receives protection from competition, it reduces its in-
vestment level and slows the innovation process. The PGA varies the patent granting stage and
the prize to induce firms to innovate quickly. In actual patent policy, there is a time limit on how
long a product is protected under a patent. If firms develop the product too late, then they may
not receive any (substantial) prize. This time limit could also serve both as a filtering device and
an incentive for quick innovation, and therefore the planner may not rely on a race to differenti-
ate between firms and spur investment. However, in all of the examples we computed, we chose
parameters so that the time it takes for the firms to move from the patent-granting stage to the
terminal innovation stage is short. Thus, the time limit of a patent would not significantly change
any result.
It may be possible to devise other additional policy instruments that may remedy some of the
inefficiencies that arise in the innovation race. One of the contributions of this paper is to identify
the trade-offs the patent authority and firms face as the two fundamental features of patent policy
– when a patent is granted and its associated prize – change, so that the choice of additional
instruments is not made arbitrarily.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We present the proof of this proposition for the case of strictly convex costs.
The proof easily extends to the linear cost case, but it gets messy due to the possibility of corner
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solutions. In the trivial case Ω = 0 we have VMi (xi) = 0 and a
∗(xi) = 0 for all xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}.
Thus, we assume throughout the proof that Ω > 0. The proof proceeds in four steps. First, we
prove that there exists a solution to the Bellman equation. Second, we show that the value function
is nondecreasing in the state. Third, we prove that there exists a unique optimal policy function.
Finally, we show that the policy function is nondecreasing in the state.
Firm i’s monopoly problem is a dynamic programming problem with discounting that satis-
fies the standard assumptions for the existence of a solution, see Puterman (1994, Chapter 6) or
Judd (1998, Chapter 12). The state space is finite. The discount factor satisfies β < 1. The cost
function Ci(·) is continuous and thus bounded on the compact effort set A. The transition proba-
bility function p(x′i|·, xi) is also continuous on A for all xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}. Therefore, there exists
a unique solution VMi to the Bellman equation and some optimal effort level a
∗(xi) for each stage
xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}.
Fix a state xi < N and an optimal effort level a∗(xi). The value VMi (xi) satisfies the equation
VMi (xi) =
−Ci(a∗(xi)) + βp(xi + 1|a∗(xi), xi)VMi (xi + 1)
1− βp(xi|a∗(xi), xi) .
Since Ci(·) is nonnegative, β < 1, and VMi (xi + 1) ≥ 0 it follows that VMi (xi) ≤ VMi (xi + 1).
For the remainder of the proof we make use of the special form of the transition probability
function p. Without loss of generality we assume that F is independent of the state xi and write
F (xi|xi) = F < 1. Under all our assumptions (Ω > 0, C(0) = 0, C ′(0) = 0, and p(xi|xi, ai) = F ai)
it holds that VMi (xi) > 0 and a
∗(xi) > 0 for all xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}. Note that the optimal effort
level is always in the interior of the set A. Given the value function VMi , a necessary (and sufficient)
first-order condition for the optimal effort level is
F aβ lnF (VMi (xi)− VMi (xi + 1))− C ′i(a) = 0.
This equation must have a least one solution according to the first step of this proof. The second
derivative of the function on the left-hand side equals F aβ(lnF )2(VMi (xi)−VMi (xi+1))−C ′′i (a) < 0.
Hence, there is a unique optimal effort a∗(xi).
Given the value VMi (xi + 1), the optimal effort a
∗(xi) and value VMi (xi) must be the (unique)
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solution of the following system of two equations in the two variables a and V, respectively,
V (1− βF a)− β(1− F a)VMi (xi + 1) + C(a) = 0
F aβ lnF (V − VMi (xi + 1))− C ′i(a) = 0
An application of the Implicit Function Theorem reveals that both variables in the solution are
nondecreasing functions of the value VMi (xi + 1). The Jacobian of the function on the left-hand
side at the solution equals
J =
[
1− βF a 0
F a(β lnF ) F aβ(lnF )2(V − VMi (xi + 1))− C ′′(a)
]
.
The gradient of the function on the left-hand side with respect to the parameter VMi (xi+ 1) equals(
−β(1− F a)
−F aβ lnF
)
.
The Implicit Function Theorem yields ∂V∂VMi (xi+1)
∂a
∂VMi (xi+1)
 = − 1
D
[
F aβ(lnF )2(V − VMi (xi + 1))− C ′′(a) 0
−F a(β lnF ) 1− βF a
] (
−β(1− F a)
−F aβ lnF
)
≥ 0,
where D = (1−βF a)(F aβ(lnF )2(V −VMi (xi+1))−C ′′(a)) < 0 is the determinant of the Jacobian.
The value function VMi is nondecreasing in the state xi and a
∗(xi) in nondecreasing in the value
VMi (xi + 1). Thus, the function a
∗ in nondecreasing in the state.
Proof of Theorem 1. We present again the proof for the case of strictly convex costs. For a given
patent policy (D, γ) the strategy functions σ∗i , i = 1, 2, constitute a Markov perfect equilibrium if
they simultaneously solve equations (6). The proof is by backward induction. If xi = D for some i,
then an optimal strategy pair σ∗i (xi, x−i), i = 1, 2, and a pair of value functions Vi, i = 1, 2, trivially
exist. It is now sufficient to prove that for any state (x1, x2) ∈ X with xi < D, i = 1, 2, there exists
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (a∗1, a∗2). To prove the existence of such an equilibrium we define
a continuous function f on a convex and compact set such that any fixed point of this function is
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Given are a state (x1, x2) ∈ X with xi < D, i = 1, 2, and values Vi(xi + 1, x−i),Vi(xi, x−i +
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1),Vi(xi+1, x−i+1) from the states that can be reached from (x1, x2) in one period. As in the proof
of Proposition 1 we assume without loss of generality that the transition probability distribution is
independent of the state and we write F (xi|xi) = F, i = 1, 2. We define a function f on a domain
S ≡ A × [0, γB] × A × [0, γB]. Choose an arbitrary element (aˆi, Vi, aˆ−i, V−i) ∈ S. Consider the
equation
0 = −C ′i(ai)
(
1
F
)ai
+ β lnF ·(
F aˆ−i(Vi − Vi(xi + 1, x−i)) + (1− F aˆ−i)(Vi(xi, x−i + 1)− Vi(xi + 1, x−i + 1))
)
with the one unknown ai. If δ ≡ F aˆ−i(Vi − Vi(xi + 1, x−i)) + (1− F aˆ−i)(Vi(xi, x−i + 1)− Vi(xi +
1, x−i + 1)) is positive, then this equation has no solution. In this case we define a´i = 0. If δ ≤ 0
then this equation has a unique solution a´i ≥ 0 (since −C ′′i (ai)
(
1
F
)ai +C ′i(ai) lnF ( 1F )ai < 0 for all
ai ∈ A). Note that a´i ∈ A. We define fi,1(aˆi, Vi, aˆ−i, V−i) = a´i. Note that δ is continuous in Vi. An
application of the Implicit Function Theorem shows that fi,1 is continuous in Vi.
Next define V´i by
V´i =
1
1− βF a´iF aˆ−i
(
−C(a´i) + β
(
F a´i(1− F aˆ−i)Vi(xi, x−i + 1))
+(1− F a´i)F aˆ−iVi(xi + 1, x−i)) + (1− F a´i)(1− F aˆ−i)Vi(xi + 1, x−i + 1))
))
.
Note that V´i ∈ [0, γB] and define fi,2(aˆi, Vi, aˆ−i, V−i) = V´i. Clearly, the function fi,2 is continuous.
In summary, we have defined a continuous function f = (f1,1, f1,2, f2,1, f2,2) : S → S mapping
the convex and compact domain S into itself. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem implies that f has
a fixed point (a∗1, V ∗1 , a∗2, V ∗2 ) ∈ S. By construction of the function f this fixed point satisfies the
equations (5) and (6). This completes the proof of the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in the state (x1, x2).
B Computing Optimal Patent Policies
For any specific patent policy, (D, γ), we need to compute the equilibrium of the race which involves
solving two dynamic problems. First, we solve the dynamic optimization problem for each firm
after it wins the patent. Second, we solve the patent race in the duopoly phase. We discuss the
solution procedures for these two problems in detail.
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B.1 Computing the Monopoly Phase
The monopoly phase begins after one of the firms reaches stage D, which can take any value between
0 and N . Therefore, we solve the monopoly problem for all xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, i = 1, 2. The
successful firm’s value function during the monopoly phase, VMi , solves the Bellman equation 2.
We compute it by backward induction on states beginning at stage N and proceeding to the lower
stages. At stage N, VMi (N) = Ω and a
M
i (N) = 0. Once we have computed a
M
i (x
′) and VMi (x
′) for
x′ > xi, we can then compute the value functions VMi (xi) and policy functions a
M
i (xi) by using
equations (2) and (3).
In addition to employing a standard value function iteration and implementing the Gauss-
Seidel method for dynamic programming, (see p. 418 in Judd (1998)), we also occasionally use
a second approach when the convergence criterion is very tight. This second approach solves a
nonlinear system of first-order necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions are necessary
and sufficient given our assumption on the cost and Markov transition functions. The conditions
are as follows:
VMi (xi) = −Ci(ai) + β
∑
x′i≥xi
p(x′i|ai, xi)VMi (x′i)(8)
0 = −C ′i(ai) + β
∑
x′i≥xi
∂
∂ai
p(x′i|ai, xi)VMi (x′i) + λi(9)
0 = λiai(10)
0 ≤ λi, ai.(11)
To find the solution to (8)–(11), we convert it into a nonlinear system of equations that guarantees
ai to be nonnegative. For this purpose we define
ai = max{0, αi}κ and λi = max{0,−αi}κ
where κ ≥ 3 is an integer and αi ∈ <. Note that, by definition, equation (10) and inequalities (11)
are immediately satisfied. Thus, the unique solution to the nonlinear system of the two equations
(8) and (9) with ai = max{αi, 0}κ in the two unknowns VMi (xi) and αi yields the optimal policy
and the corresponding value function of the monopolist.15
15The constraint on the effort level a can only be binding when the cost function C is linear. Nevertheless we use the
constrained-optimization approach involving a Lagrange multiplier even when we use strictly convex cost functions.
This approach is numerically much more stable than solving the first-order conditions of the unconstrained problem.
36 OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES
B.2 Solving the Duopoly Phase by an Upwind Procedure
The duopoly game has a finite set of states and could be solved using the techniques of Pakes and
McGuire (1994). However, we have a special structure which allows for much faster computation.
Since the game is over when one firm reaches D, the monopoly phase solution provides the value
for each firm at all states (x1, x2) with max{x1, x2} = D. The solution process for the remaining
stages of the duopoly game utilizes a backward induction technique. For example, if we know the
value at (D,D), (D − 1, D), and (D,D − 1), then the game at (D − 1, D − 1) reduces to a simple
game where the only unknowns are the values and actions of each firm at (D − 1, D − 1).
At each state (x1, x2) , we compute an equilibrium action pair (σ1(x1, x2), σ2(x1, x2)) and the
corresponding values (V1(x1, x2),V2(x1, x2)) that satisfy conditions (5, 6). This computational
task is surprisingly difficult; a Gauss-Seidel iterated best reply approach, a natural choice in such
dynamic games that solves each firm’s problem sequentially and updates their best responses to
each other’s actions, typically does not converge in our setting. Consequently we employ an alter-
native algorithm. We formulate the equilibrium problem in state (x1, x2) as a nonlinear system of
equations. The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. For i = 1, 2,
0 = −Vi(xi, x−i)− Ci(ai) + β
∑
x
′
i,x
′
−i
p(x′i|ai, xi)p(x′−i|a−i, x−i)Vi(x′i, x′−i)(12)
0 = − ∂
∂ai
Ci(ai) + β
∑
x
′
i,x
′
−i
∂
∂ai
p(x′i|ai, xi)p(x′−i|a−i, x−i)Vi(x′i, x′−i) + λi(13)
0 = λiai(14)
0 ≤ λi, ai.(15)
We transform this system of equations and inequalities into a nonlinear system of equations
characterizing a Nash equilibrium at a state (x1, x2) with xi, x−i < D. We set ai = max{0, αi}κ
and λi = max{0,−αi}κ in equations (12) and (13) and omit the complementary slackness conditions
(14) and the inequalities (15). The solutions to the resulting four nonlinear equations in the four
unknowns Vi(xi, x−i) and αi for i = 1, 2, correspond to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Again we solve a constrained problem instead of an unconstrained problem since this choice results
in a numerically much more stable procedure.
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B.3 Optimal Patent Policy
The PGA maximizes its objective function WS or WC taking into consideration the effect of its
policy (D, γ) on firms’ investment. We parameterize the PGA’s objective function in θ and B.
Given the equilibrium strategies σi (x) of the race and optimal policy function aMi (x) during the
monopoly phase, we can define the social surplus function WS recursively as follows:
WS,D (x1, x2) = −
2∑
i=1
Ci(σi (x)) + β
∑
x
′
1,x
′
2
p(x′1|σ1 (x) , x1)p(x′2|σ2 (x) , x2)W (x′1, x′2), x1, x2 < D
W (x1, x2) =

WS,D (x1, x2) , x1, x2 < D
1
2
(
WS,M (1, D) +WS,M (2, D)
)
, x1 = x2 = D
WS,M (i, xi), xi = D and x−i < D, i = 1, 2
WS,M (i, xi) = −Ci(aMi (x)) + β
∑
x′i≥xi
p(x′i|aMi (xi) , xi)WS,M (i, x′i), xi < N, i = 1, 2
WS,M (N) = B − θγB.
The initial social surplus at t = 0 equals
WS(D, γ; θ,B) = WS,D(0, 0).
The consumer surplus function WC is similarly defined as
WC,D (x1, x2) = β
∑
x
′
1,x
′
2
p(x′1|σ1 (x) , x1)p(x′2|σ2 (x) , x2)W (x′1, x′2), x1, x2 < D
W (x1, x2) =

WC,D (x1, x2) , x1, x2 < D
1
2
(
WC,M (1, D) +WC,M (2, D)
)
, x1 = x2 = D
WC,M (i, xi), xi = D and x−i < D, i = 1, 2
WC,M (i, xi) = β
∑
x′i≥xi
p(x′i|aMi (xi) , xi)WC,M (i, x′i), xi < N, i = 1, 2
WC,M (N) = (1− γ)B − θγB.
Initial consumer surplus at t = 0 equals
WC(D, γ; θ,B) = WC,D(0, 0).
Definition 2. The social surplus maximizing patent policy is a pair (D∗, γ∗) that maximizes
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WS(D, γ; θ,B) given (θ,B). The consumer surplus maximizing patent policy is a pair (D∗, γ∗)
that maximizes WC(D, γ; θ,B) given (θ,B).
We solve the dynamic equilibrium of the patent race for a large discrete set of (D, γ) pairs to
find the optimal PGA policy (D∗, γ∗). The ratio γ takes values from a discrete set Γ ⊂ [0, γ¯]. We
summarize all computational steps in the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 (Computation of welfare-maximizing policy).
1. Select an objective function W ∈ {WS ,WC}. Fix the parameters θ and B. Choose a grid
Γ ⊂ [0, 1] .
2. For each γ ∈ Γ
(a) Set Ω = γB.
(b) Solve the monopoly problem given Ω.
(c) For D = 0, compute the expected planner surplus, W (0, γ; θ,B), of giving the patent
monopoly to a firm chosen randomly with equal probabilities.
(d) For each D ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
i. Solve the duopoly game for x1, x2 < D.
ii. Compute the expected planner surplus, W (D, γ; θ,B)
3. Find the optimal (D∗, γ∗) which maximizes W (D, γ; θ,B).
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